Ownership and first-person authority from a normative pragmatist perspective
Research output: Contribution to journal › Journal article › Research › peer-review
Mental episodes are typically associated with subjective ownership and first-person authority. My belief that an apple is red is had by me; it is mine and I’m in a privileged position to know it. Your experience of red is had by you; it is yours and you are in a privileged position to know it. The two assumptions are that mental events are had by individuals to whom they occur, and that owners are in a privileged epistemic position to fallibly report their own. This paper asks how to understand ownership and first-person authority (section 1). It argues that the two assumptions should not be accepted by default (section 2). A normative pragmatism is specified, on which mental episodes are not owned, but owed to practices of reason articulation (section 3). Finally, a positive account of ownership and first-person authority is considered (section 4).
Original language | English |
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Journal | Contemporary Pragmatism |
Volume | 17 |
Pages (from-to) | 268-285 |
Number of pages | 18 |
ISSN | 1572-3429 |
DOIs | |
Publication status | Published - 2020 |
Externally published | Yes |
ID: 333305430