Ownership and first-person authority from a normative pragmatist perspective

Research output: Contribution to journal › Journal article › Research › peer-review

Standard

Ownership and first-person authority from a normative pragmatist perspective. / Lo Presti, Patrizio Ulf Enrico.

In: Contemporary Pragmatism, Vol. 17, 2020, p. 268-285.

Research output: Contribution to journal › Journal article › Research › peer-review

Harvard

Lo Presti, PUE 2020, 'Ownership and first-person authority from a normative pragmatist perspective', Contemporary Pragmatism, vol. 17, pp. 268-285. https://doi.org/10.1163/18758185-17040004

APA

Lo Presti, P. U. E. (2020). Ownership and first-person authority from a normative pragmatist perspective. Contemporary Pragmatism, 17, 268-285. https://doi.org/10.1163/18758185-17040004

Vancouver

Lo Presti PUE. Ownership and first-person authority from a normative pragmatist perspective. Contemporary Pragmatism. 2020;17:268-285. https://doi.org/10.1163/18758185-17040004

Author

Lo Presti, Patrizio Ulf Enrico. / Ownership and first-person authority from a normative pragmatist perspective. In: Contemporary Pragmatism. 2020 ; Vol. 17. pp. 268-285.

Bibtex

@article{829d5dd0f88e4087b89eb321f0116f4a,
title = "Ownership and first-person authority from a normative pragmatist perspective",
abstract = "Mental episodes are typically associated with subjective ownership and first-person authority. My belief that an apple is red is had by me; it is mine and I{\textquoteright}m in a privileged position to know it. Your experience of red is had by you; it is yours and you are in a privileged position to know it. The two assumptions are that mental events are had by individuals to whom they occur, and that owners are in a privileged epistemic position to fallibly report their own. This paper asks how to understand ownership and first-person authority (section 1). It argues that the two assumptions should not be accepted by default (section 2). A normative pragmatism is specified, on which mental episodes are not owned, but owed to practices of reason articulation (section 3). Finally, a positive account of ownership and first-person authority is considered (section 4).",
author = "{Lo Presti}, {Patrizio Ulf Enrico}",
year = "2020",
doi = "10.1163/18758185-17040004",
language = "English",
volume = "17",
pages = "268--285",
journal = "Contemporary Pragmatism",
issn = "1572-3429",
publisher = "Brill",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - Ownership and first-person authority from a normative pragmatist perspective

AU - Lo Presti, Patrizio Ulf Enrico

PY - 2020

Y1 - 2020

N2 - Mental episodes are typically associated with subjective ownership and first-person authority. My belief that an apple is red is had by me; it is mine and I’m in a privileged position to know it. Your experience of red is had by you; it is yours and you are in a privileged position to know it. The two assumptions are that mental events are had by individuals to whom they occur, and that owners are in a privileged epistemic position to fallibly report their own. This paper asks how to understand ownership and first-person authority (section 1). It argues that the two assumptions should not be accepted by default (section 2). A normative pragmatism is specified, on which mental episodes are not owned, but owed to practices of reason articulation (section 3). Finally, a positive account of ownership and first-person authority is considered (section 4).

AB - Mental episodes are typically associated with subjective ownership and first-person authority. My belief that an apple is red is had by me; it is mine and I’m in a privileged position to know it. Your experience of red is had by you; it is yours and you are in a privileged position to know it. The two assumptions are that mental events are had by individuals to whom they occur, and that owners are in a privileged epistemic position to fallibly report their own. This paper asks how to understand ownership and first-person authority (section 1). It argues that the two assumptions should not be accepted by default (section 2). A normative pragmatism is specified, on which mental episodes are not owned, but owed to practices of reason articulation (section 3). Finally, a positive account of ownership and first-person authority is considered (section 4).

U2 - 10.1163/18758185-17040004

DO - 10.1163/18758185-17040004

M3 - Journal article

VL - 17

SP - 268

EP - 285

JO - Contemporary Pragmatism

JF - Contemporary Pragmatism

SN - 1572-3429

ER -

ID: 333305430