A Unified Account of Information, Misinformation, and Disinformation
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A Unified Account of Information, Misinformation, and Disinformation. / Søe, Sille Obelitz.
In: Synthese - An international journal for epistemology, methodology and philosophy of science, Vol. 198, 2021, p. 5929-5949.Research output: Contribution to journal › Journal article › Research › peer-review
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TY - JOUR
T1 - A Unified Account of Information, Misinformation, and Disinformation
AU - Søe, Sille Obelitz
PY - 2021
Y1 - 2021
N2 - In this paper I develop and present a unified account of information, misinformation, and disinformation and their interconnections. The unified account is rooted in Paul Grice’s notions of natural and non-natural meaning (in: Grice (ed) Studies in the way of words. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, pp 213–223, 1957) and a corresponding distinction between natural and non-natural information (Scarantino and Piccinini in Metaphilosophy 41(3):313–330, 2010). I argue that we can specify at least three specific kinds of non-natural information. Thus, as varieties of non-natural information there is intentionally non-misleading information, unintentionally misleading information—i.e. misinformation—and intentionally misleading information—i.e. disinformation. By shifting the focus from the truth-values of content to the intention/intentionality and misleadingness/non-misleadingness of that content I obtain a unified account that makes room for the potential misleadingness of true content (true disinformation), the potential non-misleadingness of false content (irony), and everything in between.
AB - In this paper I develop and present a unified account of information, misinformation, and disinformation and their interconnections. The unified account is rooted in Paul Grice’s notions of natural and non-natural meaning (in: Grice (ed) Studies in the way of words. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, pp 213–223, 1957) and a corresponding distinction between natural and non-natural information (Scarantino and Piccinini in Metaphilosophy 41(3):313–330, 2010). I argue that we can specify at least three specific kinds of non-natural information. Thus, as varieties of non-natural information there is intentionally non-misleading information, unintentionally misleading information—i.e. misinformation—and intentionally misleading information—i.e. disinformation. By shifting the focus from the truth-values of content to the intention/intentionality and misleadingness/non-misleadingness of that content I obtain a unified account that makes room for the potential misleadingness of true content (true disinformation), the potential non-misleadingness of false content (irony), and everything in between.
U2 - 10.1007/s11229-019-02444-x
DO - 10.1007/s11229-019-02444-x
M3 - Journal article
VL - 198
SP - 5929
EP - 5949
JO - Synthese
JF - Synthese
SN - 0039-7857
ER -
ID: 228730661