A Floridian dilemma. Semantic information and truth

Research output: Contribution to journal › Journal article › Research › peer-review

Standard

A Floridian dilemma. Semantic information and truth. / Søe, Sille Obelitz.

In: Information Research. An International Electronic Journal, Vol. 24, No. 2, 2019.

Research output: Contribution to journal › Journal article › Research › peer-review

Harvard

Søe, SO 2019, 'A Floridian dilemma. Semantic information and truth', Information Research. An International Electronic Journal, vol. 24, no. 2. <http://www.informationr.net/ir/24-2/paper827.html>

APA

Søe, S. O. (2019). A Floridian dilemma. Semantic information and truth. Information Research. An International Electronic Journal, 24(2). http://www.informationr.net/ir/24-2/paper827.html

Vancouver

Søe SO. A Floridian dilemma. Semantic information and truth. Information Research. An International Electronic Journal. 2019;24(2).

Author

Søe, Sille Obelitz. / A Floridian dilemma. Semantic information and truth. In: Information Research. An International Electronic Journal. 2019 ; Vol. 24, No. 2.

Bibtex

@article{2482987856a547e99b337079249fe349,
title = "A Floridian dilemma. Semantic information and truth",
abstract = "Introduction. Truth and falsity play a dominant role in contemporary work on information, misinformation, and disinformation. Discussions of these notions typically include remarks about their truth-values, or even explicit arguments in favour of their having fixed truth-values. Method. I use Chalmers{\textquoteright}s framework for identifying and potentially solving verbal disputes to analyse the discussions regarding information and truth.Analysis. Philosophical analyses of the discussions of information and its relation to truth, as they play out between Luciano Floridi and Don Fallis (among others), are carried out in the paper. Results. I find that these discussions are in fact a verbal dispute. Further, the dominant focus on truth and falsity in the work on information, misinformation, and disinformation, within philosophy of information, gives rise to a Floridian dilemma: a dilemma in which Floridi{\textquoteright}s definition of semantic information, as inherently truthful, turns out to encompass certain varieties of misinformation and disinformation while excluding others.Conclusion. I recommend that information must be defined as semantic content in general without reference to truth, i.e. as truth-neutral, such that all varieties of misinformation and disinformation can be kinds of information.",
author = "S{\o}e, {Sille Obelitz}",
year = "2019",
language = "English",
volume = "24",
journal = "Information Research",
issn = "1368-1613",
publisher = "University of Sheffield Department of Information Studies",
number = "2",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - A Floridian dilemma. Semantic information and truth

AU - Søe, Sille Obelitz

PY - 2019

Y1 - 2019

N2 - Introduction. Truth and falsity play a dominant role in contemporary work on information, misinformation, and disinformation. Discussions of these notions typically include remarks about their truth-values, or even explicit arguments in favour of their having fixed truth-values. Method. I use Chalmers’s framework for identifying and potentially solving verbal disputes to analyse the discussions regarding information and truth.Analysis. Philosophical analyses of the discussions of information and its relation to truth, as they play out between Luciano Floridi and Don Fallis (among others), are carried out in the paper. Results. I find that these discussions are in fact a verbal dispute. Further, the dominant focus on truth and falsity in the work on information, misinformation, and disinformation, within philosophy of information, gives rise to a Floridian dilemma: a dilemma in which Floridi’s definition of semantic information, as inherently truthful, turns out to encompass certain varieties of misinformation and disinformation while excluding others.Conclusion. I recommend that information must be defined as semantic content in general without reference to truth, i.e. as truth-neutral, such that all varieties of misinformation and disinformation can be kinds of information.

AB - Introduction. Truth and falsity play a dominant role in contemporary work on information, misinformation, and disinformation. Discussions of these notions typically include remarks about their truth-values, or even explicit arguments in favour of their having fixed truth-values. Method. I use Chalmers’s framework for identifying and potentially solving verbal disputes to analyse the discussions regarding information and truth.Analysis. Philosophical analyses of the discussions of information and its relation to truth, as they play out between Luciano Floridi and Don Fallis (among others), are carried out in the paper. Results. I find that these discussions are in fact a verbal dispute. Further, the dominant focus on truth and falsity in the work on information, misinformation, and disinformation, within philosophy of information, gives rise to a Floridian dilemma: a dilemma in which Floridi’s definition of semantic information, as inherently truthful, turns out to encompass certain varieties of misinformation and disinformation while excluding others.Conclusion. I recommend that information must be defined as semantic content in general without reference to truth, i.e. as truth-neutral, such that all varieties of misinformation and disinformation can be kinds of information.

M3 - Journal article

VL - 24

JO - Information Research

JF - Information Research

SN - 1368-1613

IS - 2

ER -

ID: 222172074