Towards a Husserlian Integrative Account of Experiential and Narrative Dimensions of the Self
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Towards a Husserlian Integrative Account of Experiential and Narrative Dimensions of the Self. / Vesterager, Mette.
In: Journal of Phenomenological Psychology, Vol. 50, No. 2, 2019, p. 162-188.Research output: Contribution to journal › Journal article › Research › peer-review
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TY - JOUR
T1 - Towards a Husserlian Integrative Account of Experiential and Narrative Dimensions of the Self
AU - Vesterager, Mette
PY - 2019
Y1 - 2019
N2 - The aim of this paper is to outline an integrative account of experiential and narrative dimensions of the self based on Husserl’s genetic phenomenology. I argue that we should discard “strong narrativism” which holds that our experiential life has a narrative structure and, accordingly, that experiential and narrative dimensions of the self coincide. We should also refrain from equating the experiential self with the minimal self, as the former does not simply constitute a formally individuated subject as the latter but a properly individualized one with personal characteristics and habituality. Husserl’s genetic phenomenology offers both a description of the individualized self as experiential, i.e. as pre-reflective and embodied, and as narrative, i.e. as an autonomous linguistic agent. Through Husserl’s concepts of sedimentation and secondary passivity, we can explain the dialectical relationship between experiential and narrative dimensions of the self.
AB - The aim of this paper is to outline an integrative account of experiential and narrative dimensions of the self based on Husserl’s genetic phenomenology. I argue that we should discard “strong narrativism” which holds that our experiential life has a narrative structure and, accordingly, that experiential and narrative dimensions of the self coincide. We should also refrain from equating the experiential self with the minimal self, as the former does not simply constitute a formally individuated subject as the latter but a properly individualized one with personal characteristics and habituality. Husserl’s genetic phenomenology offers both a description of the individualized self as experiential, i.e. as pre-reflective and embodied, and as narrative, i.e. as an autonomous linguistic agent. Through Husserl’s concepts of sedimentation and secondary passivity, we can explain the dialectical relationship between experiential and narrative dimensions of the self.
U2 - 10.1163/15691624-12341361
DO - 10.1163/15691624-12341361
M3 - Journal article
VL - 50
SP - 162
EP - 188
JO - Journal of Phenomenological Psychology
JF - Journal of Phenomenological Psychology
SN - 0047-2662
IS - 2
ER -
ID: 246198684