Backlighting and Occlusion

Research output: Contribution to journal › Journal article › Research › peer-review

Standard

Backlighting and Occlusion. / Overgaard, Søren.

In: Mind, Vol. 132, No. 525, fzac031, 2023, p. 63–83.

Research output: Contribution to journal › Journal article › Research › peer-review

Harvard

Overgaard, S 2023, 'Backlighting and Occlusion', Mind, vol. 132, no. 525, fzac031, pp. 63–83. https://doi.org/10.1093/mind/fzac031

APA

Overgaard, S. (2023). Backlighting and Occlusion. Mind, 132(525), 63–83. [ fzac031]. https://doi.org/10.1093/mind/fzac031

Vancouver

Overgaard S. Backlighting and Occlusion. Mind. 2023;132(525):63–83. fzac031. https://doi.org/10.1093/mind/fzac031

Author

Overgaard, Søren. / Backlighting and Occlusion. In: Mind. 2023 ; Vol. 132, No. 525. pp. 63–83.

Bibtex

@article{681ef623e4f04c5ab03f4a3e1b05a1a3,
title = "Backlighting and Occlusion",
abstract = "In the philosophy of perception, objects are typically frontlit. But according to Roy Sorensen, backlit objects have surprising lessons to teach us about perception. In backlit conditions, {\textquoteleft}the principles of occlusion are reversed{\textquoteright}, Sorensen (2008, p. 25) maintains. In particular, he claims we see the back surfaces of backlit objects. But as I argue in this paper, Sorensen{\textquoteright}s arguments in support of those claims are flawed. After criticizing Sorensen{\textquoteright}s arguments, I attempt to address a residual puzzle about backlit objects. The upshot of the paper is that cases of backlighting do have important philosophical lessons to teach us after all – lessons concerning the notion of perceptual occlusion.",
author = "S{\o}ren Overgaard",
year = "2023",
doi = "10.1093/mind/fzac031",
language = "English",
volume = "132",
pages = "63–83",
journal = "Mind",
issn = "0026-4423",
publisher = "Oxford University Press",
number = "525",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - Backlighting and Occlusion

AU - Overgaard, Søren

PY - 2023

Y1 - 2023

N2 - In the philosophy of perception, objects are typically frontlit. But according to Roy Sorensen, backlit objects have surprising lessons to teach us about perception. In backlit conditions, ‘the principles of occlusion are reversed’, Sorensen (2008, p. 25) maintains. In particular, he claims we see the back surfaces of backlit objects. But as I argue in this paper, Sorensen’s arguments in support of those claims are flawed. After criticizing Sorensen’s arguments, I attempt to address a residual puzzle about backlit objects. The upshot of the paper is that cases of backlighting do have important philosophical lessons to teach us after all – lessons concerning the notion of perceptual occlusion.

AB - In the philosophy of perception, objects are typically frontlit. But according to Roy Sorensen, backlit objects have surprising lessons to teach us about perception. In backlit conditions, ‘the principles of occlusion are reversed’, Sorensen (2008, p. 25) maintains. In particular, he claims we see the back surfaces of backlit objects. But as I argue in this paper, Sorensen’s arguments in support of those claims are flawed. After criticizing Sorensen’s arguments, I attempt to address a residual puzzle about backlit objects. The upshot of the paper is that cases of backlighting do have important philosophical lessons to teach us after all – lessons concerning the notion of perceptual occlusion.

U2 - 10.1093/mind/fzac031

DO - 10.1093/mind/fzac031

M3 - Journal article

VL - 132

SP - 63

EP - 83

JO - Mind

JF - Mind

SN - 0026-4423

IS - 525

M1 - fzac031

ER -

ID: 307526794