This PhD thesis examines the role of metacognition in attention control and skilled action. Metacognition refers to those mental processes of an agent that monitor, evaluate, or regulate her other mental processes. The articles explore how metacognitive processes support attention control and skill execution with a focus on two specific psychological phenomena, namely mindfulness and flow. The introduction of the thesis provides an overview of the relevant philosophical literature, clarifying how Articles 1–4 contribute to these research fields. The
introduction focuses on three topics, namely metacognition, attention, and action. It also provides some considerations on how philosophy can contribute to interdisciplinary research, notably clinical research and practice.
Article 1 concerns the phenomenon of decentering. Decentering concerns an agent’s ability to move out of immersion in her own mental state(s). It is an ability that is at the center of contemporary and mindfulness-based cognitive psychotherapies, known as third-wave cognitive behavior therapies. The article provides a novel account of decentering as a complex mental operation composed of simultaneous introspection and detachment. It argues that the
popular selection for action theory of attention cannot account for this nature of decentering.
Article 2 discusses the so-called Transparency thesis, well known in philosophy of consciousness and perception. In recent years, multiple mindfulness researchers have claimed that mindfulness introspection is in conflict with this thesis. Article 2 labels this claim the Mindfulness opacity hypothesis. Article 2 develops the hypothesis in various philosophical respects, arguing that it is well motivated both philosophically and empirically.
Article 3 targets a central problem in the science of mindfulness. This is the problem of whether mindfulness involves an essential and categorically demarcated psychological capacity. The most promising proposal is that this capacity is a form of metacognitive control. Yet, Article 3 argues that previous accounts of such metacognitive control all fail. Hence, the article defends a novel account, arguing that this provides new insights into mindfulness.
Article 4 discusses the phenomenon of flow, i.e., states where agents execute an activity with fluency, deep focus, and some feelings of enjoyment or meaning. The philosophical position known as the Automatic view of expertise claims that flow states are characteristic to athletic expertise and that this shows why experts do not consciously supervise their activity when performing optimally. Article 4 argues that this view is deeply mistaken in the light of the current psychology of flow, concerning attention and metacognition.