Getting into it in the wrong way: Interpretative phenomenological analysis and the hermeneutic circle

Research output: Contribution to journalJournal articleResearchpeer-review

Standard

Getting into it in the wrong way : Interpretative phenomenological analysis and the hermeneutic circle. / Gyollai, Daniel.

In: Nursing Philosophy, Vol. 21, No. 2, e12294, 2020, p. 1-9.

Research output: Contribution to journalJournal articleResearchpeer-review

Harvard

Gyollai, D 2020, 'Getting into it in the wrong way: Interpretative phenomenological analysis and the hermeneutic circle', Nursing Philosophy, vol. 21, no. 2, e12294, pp. 1-9. https://doi.org/10.1111/nup.12294

APA

Gyollai, D. (2020). Getting into it in the wrong way: Interpretative phenomenological analysis and the hermeneutic circle. Nursing Philosophy, 21(2), 1-9. [e12294]. https://doi.org/10.1111/nup.12294

Vancouver

Gyollai D. Getting into it in the wrong way: Interpretative phenomenological analysis and the hermeneutic circle. Nursing Philosophy. 2020;21(2):1-9. e12294. https://doi.org/10.1111/nup.12294

Author

Gyollai, Daniel. / Getting into it in the wrong way : Interpretative phenomenological analysis and the hermeneutic circle. In: Nursing Philosophy. 2020 ; Vol. 21, No. 2. pp. 1-9.

Bibtex

@article{8f08f5d629c9423fb3abb108ae900872,
title = "Getting into it in the wrong way: Interpretative phenomenological analysis and the hermeneutic circle",
abstract = "This article critically analyses the hermeneutic commitment of interpretative phenomenological analysis (IPA). In the theoretical framework of IPA, the role of preconceptions and prejudices is consistently downplayed; priority is given to the participant's own words. Paley has argued that IPA{\textquoteright}s interpretative phase is always and necessarily determined by the researcher's fore-conceptions, as opposed to the participant's narrative. I demonstrate that IPA{\textquoteright}s failure to recognize the importance of an external frame of reference in interpretation may arise from the misunderstanding of the method's hermeneutic underpinnings. I essentially argue that bracketing the researcher's fore-conceptions during the initial phases of IPA is merely an illusion. While it is beyond the scope of this article to dispute whether IPA is genuinely phenomenological, my claim ultimately poses a challenge to IPA{\textquoteright}s phenomenological commitment on its own terms. The article concludes with a proposal to substantially improve IPA{\textquoteright}s consistency with hermeneutic tradition and its grounding in phenomenological philosophy.",
author = "Daniel Gyollai",
year = "2020",
doi = "10.1111/nup.12294",
language = "English",
volume = "21",
pages = "1--9",
journal = "Nursing Philosophy",
issn = "1466-7681",
publisher = "Wiley-Blackwell",
number = "2",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - Getting into it in the wrong way

T2 - Interpretative phenomenological analysis and the hermeneutic circle

AU - Gyollai, Daniel

PY - 2020

Y1 - 2020

N2 - This article critically analyses the hermeneutic commitment of interpretative phenomenological analysis (IPA). In the theoretical framework of IPA, the role of preconceptions and prejudices is consistently downplayed; priority is given to the participant's own words. Paley has argued that IPA’s interpretative phase is always and necessarily determined by the researcher's fore-conceptions, as opposed to the participant's narrative. I demonstrate that IPA’s failure to recognize the importance of an external frame of reference in interpretation may arise from the misunderstanding of the method's hermeneutic underpinnings. I essentially argue that bracketing the researcher's fore-conceptions during the initial phases of IPA is merely an illusion. While it is beyond the scope of this article to dispute whether IPA is genuinely phenomenological, my claim ultimately poses a challenge to IPA’s phenomenological commitment on its own terms. The article concludes with a proposal to substantially improve IPA’s consistency with hermeneutic tradition and its grounding in phenomenological philosophy.

AB - This article critically analyses the hermeneutic commitment of interpretative phenomenological analysis (IPA). In the theoretical framework of IPA, the role of preconceptions and prejudices is consistently downplayed; priority is given to the participant's own words. Paley has argued that IPA’s interpretative phase is always and necessarily determined by the researcher's fore-conceptions, as opposed to the participant's narrative. I demonstrate that IPA’s failure to recognize the importance of an external frame of reference in interpretation may arise from the misunderstanding of the method's hermeneutic underpinnings. I essentially argue that bracketing the researcher's fore-conceptions during the initial phases of IPA is merely an illusion. While it is beyond the scope of this article to dispute whether IPA is genuinely phenomenological, my claim ultimately poses a challenge to IPA’s phenomenological commitment on its own terms. The article concludes with a proposal to substantially improve IPA’s consistency with hermeneutic tradition and its grounding in phenomenological philosophy.

U2 - 10.1111/nup.12294

DO - 10.1111/nup.12294

M3 - Journal article

VL - 21

SP - 1

EP - 9

JO - Nursing Philosophy

JF - Nursing Philosophy

SN - 1466-7681

IS - 2

M1 - e12294

ER -

ID: 338788063