Ownership and first-person authority from a normative pragmatist perspective
Publikation: Bidrag til tidsskrift › Tidsskriftartikel › Forskning › fagfællebedømt
Mental episodes are typically associated with subjective ownership and first-person authority. My belief that an apple is red is had by me; it is mine and I’m in a privileged position to know it. Your experience of red is had by you; it is yours and you are in a privileged position to know it. The two assumptions are that mental events are had by individuals to whom they occur, and that owners are in a privileged epistemic position to fallibly report their own. This paper asks how to understand ownership and first-person authority (section 1). It argues that the two assumptions should not be accepted by default (section 2). A normative pragmatism is specified, on which mental episodes are not owned, but owed to practices of reason articulation (section 3). Finally, a positive account of ownership and first-person authority is considered (section 4).
Originalsprog | Engelsk |
---|---|
Tidsskrift | Contemporary Pragmatism |
Vol/bind | 17 |
Sider (fra-til) | 268-285 |
Antal sider | 18 |
ISSN | 1572-3429 |
DOI | |
Status | Udgivet - 2020 |
Eksternt udgivet | Ja |
ID: 333305430