The feeling of agency hypothesis: a critique

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The feeling of agency hypothesis: a critique. / Grünbaum, Thor.

In: Synthese, Vol. 192, No. 10, 2015, p. 3313-3337.

Research output: Contribution to journal › Journal article › Research › peer-review

Harvard

Grünbaum, T 2015, 'The feeling of agency hypothesis: a critique', Synthese, vol. 192, no. 10, pp. 3313-3337. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-015-0704-6

APA

Grünbaum, T. (2015). The feeling of agency hypothesis: a critique. Synthese, 192(10), 3313-3337. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-015-0704-6

Vancouver

Grünbaum T. The feeling of agency hypothesis: a critique. Synthese. 2015;192(10):3313-3337. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-015-0704-6

Author

Grünbaum, Thor. / The feeling of agency hypothesis: a critique. In: Synthese. 2015 ; Vol. 192, No. 10. pp. 3313-3337.

Bibtex

@article{7eba3905bd7e4c49ae61c367f117276e,
title = "The feeling of agency hypothesis: a critique",
abstract = "A dominant view in contemporary cognitive neuroscience is that low-level, comparator-based mechanisms of motor control produce a distinctive experience often called the feeling of agency (the FoA-hypothesis). An opposing view is that comparator-based motor control is largely non-conscious and not associated with any particular type of distinctive phenomenology (the simple hypothesis). In this paper, I critically evaluate the nature of the empirical evidence researchers commonly take to support FoA-hypothesis. The aim of this paper is not only to scrutinize the FoA-hypothesis and data supposed to support it; it is equally to argue that experimentalists supporting the FoA-hypothesis fail to establish that the experimental outcomes are more probable given the FoA-hypothesis than given the simpler hypothesis.",
keywords = "Faculty of Humanities, Feeling of agency, Comparator mechanisms, Motor cognition, Cognitive neuroscience, Philosophy of action, Philosophy of science",
author = "Thor Gr{\"u}nbaum",
year = "2015",
doi = "10.1007/s11229-015-0704-6",
language = "English",
volume = "192",
pages = "3313--3337",
journal = "Synthese",
issn = "0039-7857",
publisher = "Springer",
number = "10",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - The feeling of agency hypothesis: a critique

AU - Grünbaum, Thor

PY - 2015

Y1 - 2015

N2 - A dominant view in contemporary cognitive neuroscience is that low-level, comparator-based mechanisms of motor control produce a distinctive experience often called the feeling of agency (the FoA-hypothesis). An opposing view is that comparator-based motor control is largely non-conscious and not associated with any particular type of distinctive phenomenology (the simple hypothesis). In this paper, I critically evaluate the nature of the empirical evidence researchers commonly take to support FoA-hypothesis. The aim of this paper is not only to scrutinize the FoA-hypothesis and data supposed to support it; it is equally to argue that experimentalists supporting the FoA-hypothesis fail to establish that the experimental outcomes are more probable given the FoA-hypothesis than given the simpler hypothesis.

AB - A dominant view in contemporary cognitive neuroscience is that low-level, comparator-based mechanisms of motor control produce a distinctive experience often called the feeling of agency (the FoA-hypothesis). An opposing view is that comparator-based motor control is largely non-conscious and not associated with any particular type of distinctive phenomenology (the simple hypothesis). In this paper, I critically evaluate the nature of the empirical evidence researchers commonly take to support FoA-hypothesis. The aim of this paper is not only to scrutinize the FoA-hypothesis and data supposed to support it; it is equally to argue that experimentalists supporting the FoA-hypothesis fail to establish that the experimental outcomes are more probable given the FoA-hypothesis than given the simpler hypothesis.

KW - Faculty of Humanities

KW - Feeling of agency

KW - Comparator mechanisms

KW - Motor cognition

KW - Cognitive neuroscience

KW - Philosophy of action

KW - Philosophy of science

U2 - 10.1007/s11229-015-0704-6

DO - 10.1007/s11229-015-0704-6

M3 - Journal article

VL - 192

SP - 3313

EP - 3337

JO - Synthese

JF - Synthese

SN - 0039-7857

IS - 10

ER -

ID: 131796749