Property and Human Genetic Information

Research output: Contribution to journalJournal articleResearchpeer-review

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Property and Human Genetic Information. / Nielsen, Morten Ebbe Juul; Kongsholm, Nana Cecilie Halmsted; Schovsbo, Jens Hemmingsen.

In: Journal of Community Genetics, Vol. 10, No. 1, 2019, p. 95-107.

Research output: Contribution to journalJournal articleResearchpeer-review

Harvard

Nielsen, MEJ, Kongsholm, NCH & Schovsbo, JH 2019, 'Property and Human Genetic Information', Journal of Community Genetics, vol. 10, no. 1, pp. 95-107. https://doi.org/10.1007/s12687-018-0366-4

APA

Nielsen, M. E. J., Kongsholm, N. C. H., & Schovsbo, J. H. (2019). Property and Human Genetic Information. Journal of Community Genetics, 10(1), 95-107. https://doi.org/10.1007/s12687-018-0366-4

Vancouver

Nielsen MEJ, Kongsholm NCH, Schovsbo JH. Property and Human Genetic Information. Journal of Community Genetics. 2019;10(1):95-107. https://doi.org/10.1007/s12687-018-0366-4

Author

Nielsen, Morten Ebbe Juul ; Kongsholm, Nana Cecilie Halmsted ; Schovsbo, Jens Hemmingsen. / Property and Human Genetic Information. In: Journal of Community Genetics. 2019 ; Vol. 10, No. 1. pp. 95-107.

Bibtex

@article{0600b3f60fbc468ba5cf0bee58f77255,
title = "Property and Human Genetic Information",
abstract = "Do donors (of samples from which genetic information is derived) have some sort of pre-legal (moral) or legal property right tothat information? In this paper, we address this question from both a moral philosophical and a legal point of view. We argue thatphilosophical theories about property do not seem to support a positive answer: We have not mixed our labour with our genes,and the human genome cannot be said to be a fitting object for private ownership based on some idea of self-ownership. Ananalysis of the term {\textquoteleft}property{\textquoteright} as seen from a legal perspective yields the conclusion that property is, at best, a linguistic propwhose real content has to be defined at least partially conventionally. Relevant interests that may be seen to be protected seem tobe interests of privacy or interests against exploitation. To the extent that the logic behind the patent system holds true limitingincentives decreases innovation in society. A balancing of interest must take place, and we have to make sure that patentprotection serves general societal interests and not just those of special interest groups be that inventors or donors.",
author = "Nielsen, {Morten Ebbe Juul} and Kongsholm, {Nana Cecilie Halmsted} and Schovsbo, {Jens Hemmingsen}",
year = "2019",
doi = "10.1007/s12687-018-0366-4",
language = "English",
volume = "10",
pages = "95--107",
journal = "Journal of Community Genetics",
issn = "1868-310X",
publisher = "Springer",
number = "1",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - Property and Human Genetic Information

AU - Nielsen, Morten Ebbe Juul

AU - Kongsholm, Nana Cecilie Halmsted

AU - Schovsbo, Jens Hemmingsen

PY - 2019

Y1 - 2019

N2 - Do donors (of samples from which genetic information is derived) have some sort of pre-legal (moral) or legal property right tothat information? In this paper, we address this question from both a moral philosophical and a legal point of view. We argue thatphilosophical theories about property do not seem to support a positive answer: We have not mixed our labour with our genes,and the human genome cannot be said to be a fitting object for private ownership based on some idea of self-ownership. Ananalysis of the term ‘property’ as seen from a legal perspective yields the conclusion that property is, at best, a linguistic propwhose real content has to be defined at least partially conventionally. Relevant interests that may be seen to be protected seem tobe interests of privacy or interests against exploitation. To the extent that the logic behind the patent system holds true limitingincentives decreases innovation in society. A balancing of interest must take place, and we have to make sure that patentprotection serves general societal interests and not just those of special interest groups be that inventors or donors.

AB - Do donors (of samples from which genetic information is derived) have some sort of pre-legal (moral) or legal property right tothat information? In this paper, we address this question from both a moral philosophical and a legal point of view. We argue thatphilosophical theories about property do not seem to support a positive answer: We have not mixed our labour with our genes,and the human genome cannot be said to be a fitting object for private ownership based on some idea of self-ownership. Ananalysis of the term ‘property’ as seen from a legal perspective yields the conclusion that property is, at best, a linguistic propwhose real content has to be defined at least partially conventionally. Relevant interests that may be seen to be protected seem tobe interests of privacy or interests against exploitation. To the extent that the logic behind the patent system holds true limitingincentives decreases innovation in society. A balancing of interest must take place, and we have to make sure that patentprotection serves general societal interests and not just those of special interest groups be that inventors or donors.

U2 - 10.1007/s12687-018-0366-4

DO - 10.1007/s12687-018-0366-4

M3 - Journal article

C2 - 29713893

VL - 10

SP - 95

EP - 107

JO - Journal of Community Genetics

JF - Journal of Community Genetics

SN - 1868-310X

IS - 1

ER -

ID: 186865306