Personal Responsibility and Lifestyle Diseases

Research output: Contribution to journalJournal articleResearchpeer-review

Standard

Personal Responsibility and Lifestyle Diseases. / Andersen, Martin Marchman; Nielsen, Morten Ebbe Juul.

In: Journal of Medicine and Philosophy, Vol. 41, No. 5, 2016, p. 480-499.

Research output: Contribution to journalJournal articleResearchpeer-review

Harvard

Andersen, MM & Nielsen, MEJ 2016, 'Personal Responsibility and Lifestyle Diseases', Journal of Medicine and Philosophy, vol. 41, no. 5, pp. 480-499. https://doi.org/10.1093/jmp/jhw015

APA

Andersen, M. M., & Nielsen, M. E. J. (2016). Personal Responsibility and Lifestyle Diseases. Journal of Medicine and Philosophy, 41(5), 480-499. https://doi.org/10.1093/jmp/jhw015

Vancouver

Andersen MM, Nielsen MEJ. Personal Responsibility and Lifestyle Diseases. Journal of Medicine and Philosophy. 2016;41(5):480-499. https://doi.org/10.1093/jmp/jhw015

Author

Andersen, Martin Marchman ; Nielsen, Morten Ebbe Juul. / Personal Responsibility and Lifestyle Diseases. In: Journal of Medicine and Philosophy. 2016 ; Vol. 41, No. 5. pp. 480-499.

Bibtex

@article{397053138a414b62a66267aa9f7b2601,
title = "Personal Responsibility and Lifestyle Diseases",
abstract = "What does it take for an individual to be personally responsible for behaviors that lead to increased risk of disease? We examine three approaches to responsibility that cover the most important aspects of the discussion of responsibility and spell out what it takes, according to each of them, to be responsible for behaviors leading to increased risk of disease. We show that only what we call the causal approach can adequately accommodate widely shared intuitions to the effect that certain causal influences—such as genetic make-up or certain social circumstances—diminish, or undermine personal responsibility. However, accepting the causal approach most likely makes personal responsibility impossible. We therefore need either to reject these widely shared intuitions about what counts as responsibility-softening or undermining or to accept that personal responsibility for behaviors leading to increased risk of disease rests on premises so shaky that personal responsibility is probably impossible.",
keywords = "Faculty of Humanities, distributive justice, health, health care allocation, lifestyle diseases, luck egalitarianism, responsibility",
author = "Andersen, {Martin Marchman} and Nielsen, {Morten Ebbe Juul}",
year = "2016",
doi = "10.1093/jmp/jhw015",
language = "English",
volume = "41",
pages = "480--499",
journal = "Journal of Medicine and Philosophy",
issn = "0360-5310",
publisher = "Oxford Academic",
number = "5",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - Personal Responsibility and Lifestyle Diseases

AU - Andersen, Martin Marchman

AU - Nielsen, Morten Ebbe Juul

PY - 2016

Y1 - 2016

N2 - What does it take for an individual to be personally responsible for behaviors that lead to increased risk of disease? We examine three approaches to responsibility that cover the most important aspects of the discussion of responsibility and spell out what it takes, according to each of them, to be responsible for behaviors leading to increased risk of disease. We show that only what we call the causal approach can adequately accommodate widely shared intuitions to the effect that certain causal influences—such as genetic make-up or certain social circumstances—diminish, or undermine personal responsibility. However, accepting the causal approach most likely makes personal responsibility impossible. We therefore need either to reject these widely shared intuitions about what counts as responsibility-softening or undermining or to accept that personal responsibility for behaviors leading to increased risk of disease rests on premises so shaky that personal responsibility is probably impossible.

AB - What does it take for an individual to be personally responsible for behaviors that lead to increased risk of disease? We examine three approaches to responsibility that cover the most important aspects of the discussion of responsibility and spell out what it takes, according to each of them, to be responsible for behaviors leading to increased risk of disease. We show that only what we call the causal approach can adequately accommodate widely shared intuitions to the effect that certain causal influences—such as genetic make-up or certain social circumstances—diminish, or undermine personal responsibility. However, accepting the causal approach most likely makes personal responsibility impossible. We therefore need either to reject these widely shared intuitions about what counts as responsibility-softening or undermining or to accept that personal responsibility for behaviors leading to increased risk of disease rests on premises so shaky that personal responsibility is probably impossible.

KW - Faculty of Humanities

KW - distributive justice

KW - health

KW - health care allocation

KW - lifestyle diseases

KW - luck egalitarianism

KW - responsibility

U2 - 10.1093/jmp/jhw015

DO - 10.1093/jmp/jhw015

M3 - Journal article

VL - 41

SP - 480

EP - 499

JO - Journal of Medicine and Philosophy

JF - Journal of Medicine and Philosophy

SN - 0360-5310

IS - 5

ER -

ID: 128776240