La emoción como punto de partida de la justificación ética: Reseña de: CABEZAS, Mar (2014). Ética y emoción: El papel de las emociones en la justificación de nuestros juicios morales. Prólogo de Fernando Broncano. Madrid: Plaza y Valdés. 394 páginas
Research output: Contribution to journal › Literature review › peer-review
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La emoción como punto de partida de la justificación ética : Reseña de: CABEZAS, Mar (2014). Ética y emoción: El papel de las emociones en la justificación de nuestros juicios morales. Prólogo de Fernando Broncano. Madrid: Plaza y Valdés. 394 páginas. / Montes Sanchez, Alba.
In: OXÍMORA Revista Internacional de Ética y Política , No. 8, 2016, p. 175-179.Research output: Contribution to journal › Literature review › peer-review
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RIS
TY - JOUR
T1 - La emoción como punto de partida de la justificación ética
T2 - Reseña de: CABEZAS, Mar (2014). Ética y emoción: El papel de las emociones en la justificación de nuestros juicios morales. Prólogo de Fernando Broncano. Madrid: Plaza y Valdés. 394 páginas
AU - Montes Sanchez, Alba
PY - 2016
Y1 - 2016
N2 - In her recent book Ética y emoción (Plaza y Valdés), Mar Cabezas poses a central question of metathetics: how to justify our moral judgments. The author seeks a criterion that allows us to justify to others why we judge that something is morally good or bad, a criterion that allows us to start discussing such issues and looking for rules that guide our practices. Mar Cabezas argues that, if such a criterion is to be truly universal and serve as a basis for translation between different moral languages, it must necessarily take into account the emotions. It is the emotions, according to the author, that allow us to grasp the relevance of moral damage and (to some extent) make us susceptible to receiving it. Without them we would not be moral beings.
AB - In her recent book Ética y emoción (Plaza y Valdés), Mar Cabezas poses a central question of metathetics: how to justify our moral judgments. The author seeks a criterion that allows us to justify to others why we judge that something is morally good or bad, a criterion that allows us to start discussing such issues and looking for rules that guide our practices. Mar Cabezas argues that, if such a criterion is to be truly universal and serve as a basis for translation between different moral languages, it must necessarily take into account the emotions. It is the emotions, according to the author, that allow us to grasp the relevance of moral damage and (to some extent) make us susceptible to receiving it. Without them we would not be moral beings.
KW - Det Humanistiske Fakultet
KW - emotion
KW - Ethics
KW - moral justification
M3 - Anmeldelse
SP - 175
EP - 179
JO - OXÍMORA Revista Internacional de Ética y Política
JF - OXÍMORA Revista Internacional de Ética y Política
SN - 2014-7708
IS - 8
ER -
ID: 172393884