Higher order evidence and deep disagreement

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Higher order evidence and deep disagreement. / Kappel, Klemens.

In: Topoi, Vol. 40, 2021, p. 1039–1050.

Research output: Contribution to journal › Journal article › Research › peer-review

Harvard

Kappel, K 2021, 'Higher order evidence and deep disagreement', Topoi, vol. 40, pp. 1039–1050. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11245-018-9587-8

APA

Kappel, K. (2021). Higher order evidence and deep disagreement. Topoi, 40, 1039–1050. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11245-018-9587-8

Vancouver

Kappel K. Higher order evidence and deep disagreement. Topoi. 2021;40:1039–1050. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11245-018-9587-8

Author

Kappel, Klemens. / Higher order evidence and deep disagreement. In: Topoi. 2021 ; Vol. 40. pp. 1039–1050.

Bibtex

@article{69bab3cbab574535ab9e231028811235,
title = "Higher order evidence and deep disagreement",
abstract = "In deep disagreements local disagreements are intertwined with more general basic disagreements about the relevant evidence, standards of argument or proper methods of inquiry in that domain. The paper provides a more specific conception of deep disagreement along these lines and argues that while we should generally conciliate in cases of disagreement, this is not so in deep disagreements. The paper offers a general view of disagreement, holding roughly that one should moderate one{\textquoteright}s credence towards uncertainty in so far as disagreement with others provides undefeated higher order evidence that one might have made a mistake in one{\textquoteright}s appreciation of the first order evidence. When applying this view to deep disagreement we get that in cases of deep disagreement higher order evidence from disagreement is rebutted or undercut by the nature of the disagreement. So, in cases of deep disagreement one should not moderate one{\textquoteright}s credence. I finally argue that this gives a better general view of deep disagreement than views appealing to epistemic peers, personal information or independence.",
author = "Klemens Kappel",
year = "2021",
doi = "10.1007/s11245-018-9587-8",
language = "Dansk",
volume = "40",
pages = "1039–1050",
journal = "Topoi",
issn = "0167-7411",
publisher = "Springer",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - Higher order evidence and deep disagreement

AU - Kappel, Klemens

PY - 2021

Y1 - 2021

N2 - In deep disagreements local disagreements are intertwined with more general basic disagreements about the relevant evidence, standards of argument or proper methods of inquiry in that domain. The paper provides a more specific conception of deep disagreement along these lines and argues that while we should generally conciliate in cases of disagreement, this is not so in deep disagreements. The paper offers a general view of disagreement, holding roughly that one should moderate one’s credence towards uncertainty in so far as disagreement with others provides undefeated higher order evidence that one might have made a mistake in one’s appreciation of the first order evidence. When applying this view to deep disagreement we get that in cases of deep disagreement higher order evidence from disagreement is rebutted or undercut by the nature of the disagreement. So, in cases of deep disagreement one should not moderate one’s credence. I finally argue that this gives a better general view of deep disagreement than views appealing to epistemic peers, personal information or independence.

AB - In deep disagreements local disagreements are intertwined with more general basic disagreements about the relevant evidence, standards of argument or proper methods of inquiry in that domain. The paper provides a more specific conception of deep disagreement along these lines and argues that while we should generally conciliate in cases of disagreement, this is not so in deep disagreements. The paper offers a general view of disagreement, holding roughly that one should moderate one’s credence towards uncertainty in so far as disagreement with others provides undefeated higher order evidence that one might have made a mistake in one’s appreciation of the first order evidence. When applying this view to deep disagreement we get that in cases of deep disagreement higher order evidence from disagreement is rebutted or undercut by the nature of the disagreement. So, in cases of deep disagreement one should not moderate one’s credence. I finally argue that this gives a better general view of deep disagreement than views appealing to epistemic peers, personal information or independence.

U2 - 10.1007/s11245-018-9587-8

DO - 10.1007/s11245-018-9587-8

M3 - Tidsskriftartikel

VL - 40

SP - 1039

EP - 1050

JO - Topoi

JF - Topoi

SN - 0167-7411

ER -

ID: 195588973